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Abstract
Economies of scale in upstream production can lead both disintegrated downstream
firm as well as its vertically integrated rival to outsource offshore for intermediate
goods, even if offshore production has moderate cost disadvantage compared to in-
house production of the vertically integrated firm.
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1 Introduction
In this era of globalization, outsourcing has become a prominent industry practice. It has
been observed that scale economies could play an important role in determining firms’ sourc-
ing patterns.1 The aim of this paper is to explore the strategic effect of scale economies in
driving the outsourcing trend.
We carry out our analysis under a Cournot duopoly model in the downstream final good
market. One of these downstream firms is vertically integrated, which can produce the
required intermediate good in-house, whereas the other firm is disintegrated and cannot
produce it. A competitive fringe of firms located offshore can also produce the intermediate
good. The production technology of the intermediate good of both the integrated firm and
the fringe exhibits economies of scale. The disintegrated firm can acquire the intermediate
good either from its integrated rival or from the offshore fringe, while the integrated firm
can either produce it in-house or acquire it from the fringe.
Our main result is that, in this scenario, both downstream firms—the disintegrated firm
as well as its integrated rival— will outsource to the offshore fringe even if the fringe has
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1It is noticed that “the importance of economies of scale is the most talked about aspect of outsourcing”
(Outsourcing Journal, May 2001. Source: http://www.outsourcing-journal.com/may2001-insights.html). A
major reason for firms to outsource is to exploit “an outside provider’s lower cost structure, which may be
the result of a greater economies of scale” (Burkholder (2005), p. 52). For example, in IT outsourcing, it is
reported that “in many cases the customer wants to outsource the IT-specific know-how” because “vendor
specialized in IT offers attractive advantages including economies of scale” (Rost (2006), p. 19).
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a cost disadvantage in the intermediate good compared to the integrated firm, so long as the
disadvantage is not too severe.2
This result is driven by the strategic effect of economies of scale. In the presence of
scale economies, an outsourcing order from the disintegrated firm to its integrated rival
makes the rival more efficient by lowering its marginal cost of production. Unwilling to give
such an efficiency edge to its downstream rival, the disintegrated firm turns to the offshore
fringe for its intermediate good. Given that, scale economies of the fringe can be better
exploited if the integrated firm outsources to the fringe as well. This leads both downstream
firms to outsource offshore, with the integrated firm giving up its in-house production of the
intermediate good. This strategic effect of scale economies dominates any cost disadvantage
the offshore fringe might have, as long as such disadvantage is not substantial.
There is a large literature that considers various strategic aspects of sourcing (see, e.g.,
Cachon and Harker (2002), Shy and Stenbacka (2003), Chen et al. (2004), Heavner (2004),
Chen (2005), Buehler and Haucap (2006), Arya et al. (2008a,b), Chen et al. (2009)). The
paper most closely related to ours is Chen (2005), who argues that an integrated firm might
have incentive to disintegrate in order to better exploit scale economies. In both papers, scale
economies creates reluctance on the part of disintegrated downstream firm to purchase from
its integrated rival. However, our paper differs from Chen (2005) in several respects. First,
in Chen (2005) the integrated firm is the only one in the upstream market whose technology
exhibits scale economies, while all other firms in that market are part of a competitive fringe
and produce at constant marginal cost. In contrast, in our paper the technology of the
integrated firm as well as the fringe has economies of scale. Scale economies of the fringe in
our model drive both downstream firms—disintegrated as well as integrated—to order from
the fringe. This is an additional strategic effect of economies of scale which is absent in
the model of Chen (2005). Second, these two papers intend to explain different economic
phenomena. Chen (2005) focuses on vertical disintegration as a device for integrated firm to
win upstream competition, whereas in our paper, the objective is to highlight the strategic
role of scale economies in driving the offshore outsourcing trend. In particular, we show that
as long as offshore providers specialize on upstream production, the integrated firm will give
up its in-house production and join its disintegrated rival in outsourcing offshore.3
Cachon and Harker (2002) illustrate a different strategic effect scale economies might have
to favor outsourcing. When final good competitors face scale economies in their intermediate
good production, in-house production of the intermediate good leads them strong incentive
2According to our result, the presence of economies of scale may lead the trend of offshore outsourcing
to well persist even when offshore cost advantage diminishes. In fact, nowadays evidences are showing that
difference in labor costs between countries becomes smaller as time goes by. To quote one observation, “in
most offshore countries, the salaries for software developers have been continually growing over the past few
years. Further future growth is to be expected” (Rost (2006), p. 35).
3There are evidences which support the argument that, firms by not entering the final-good market, are
more likely to attract orders for intermediate goods. For example, in 1980’s, US companies in the electronics
industry were seeking “to diversify their sources of supply”. In order to get the US business, Malaysia
and Singapore emphasized in their government policies that both nations “were not attempting to promote
national champions in the electronic industry”, but rather “to build a complementary supply base, not to
create local rivals that might displace foreign producers”. Their success in becoming major supply hubs for
electronic components is well documented (see Ravenhill (2003)). Although both nations have the advantage
of low labor cost, their deliberate abstention from final-good markets also created them a competitive edge
in markets of intermediate goods.
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for cutting prices in the final good market in order to boost selling thus better exploit scale
economies. Instead, if they outsource the intermediate good to upstream provider by paying
unit price, such incentive for further cutting downstream prices is weakened, which mitigates
downstream competition therefore may lead to both firms’ advantage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and gives our major
result. Section 3 fully characterizes equilibrium of the model, also gives the proof. Section 4
then discusses and concludes.
2 Model and Major Result
Firms I and D are Cournot duopolists in the market for a final good β. Let qk be the
quantity of β produced by firm k, k = I,D and Q = qI + qD. The inverse demand of good
β is P = max{a−Q, 0}, where a > 0.
An intermediate good α is required to produce β. Firm I can manufacture α, but D
cannot. In other words, firm I is a vertically integrated firm while D is disintegrated. There
is also an “outside” competitive fringe of identical firms which can manufacture α. Let U
be a representative firm of this fringe.
I and D can convert one unit of α into one unit of β at the same constant average
cost, which is normalized to be zero. Both I and U face economies of scale in producing α.
Specifically, for j = I, U , the cost function Cj(q) of firm j is given by
CI(q) =
{
bq − cq2 for q ≤ b/2c
b2/4c for q > b/2c
; CU(q) =
{
λbq − cq2 for q ≤ λb/2c
(λb)2/4c for q > λb/2c
We make the following assumptions:
b/2c > a > λb > 0. (1)
The first inequality guarantees that, in equilibrium the production of good α entails positive
marginal cost. Also assume
1 ≤ λ < λ¯ ≡ (a+ b− 2ac)/2b(1− c). (2)
Here λ ≥ 1 catches that U may have a cost disadvantage compared to I;4 λ < λ¯ guarantees
that D will produce positive quantity when it orders good α exclusively from U , given that
I produces α by itself.5 Note that for j = I, U , average cost ACj(q) = Cj(q)/q is linearly
decreasing in q for q ≤ b/2c. Moreover, (1) and (2) imply
1/2 > b/2a > c > 0, (3)
so that Cj(q), j = I, U is not “too concave” in order to ensure the existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium in the market β.
4This assumption allows us to focus on the strategic effect of scale economies in firms’ sourcing decision.
Our model is readily extended to the case when offshore suppliers have cost advantage.
5If this assumption is violated, then the cost of α for U is too large and D has to rely entirely on I for
its required α. Then it is optimal for I to charge a very high price of α for D. This will drive D out of the
market β and establish I a monopolist. It can be shown from (2) that b/2c > λ¯b, so λ¯ satisfies (1).
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For k = I,D, firm k has two alternative sources of acquiring α: either exclusively from
U or exclusively from I.6 Denote the sourcing mode of firm k by δk. Then δk = j if firm k
orders α from j = U, I, with δI = I meaning that I produces α by itself. In our model U is
a non-strategic player due to the perfect competition.7 The strategic interaction between I
and D is modelled into a three-stage game, denoted as game G:
Stage one. I announces price pI for good α.
Stage two. I and D simultaneously choose their sourcing modes δI , δD.
Stage three. I and D engage in quantity competition in the market β.
Solution concept for the game is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure
strategy.
Let X be the total quantity of α outsourced to U . For X > 0, average production cost
of U is
v ≡ v(X) ≡ AC(X) = λb− cX.
Since U is a non-strategic player, the price of U for good α when U receives total outsourcing
order X is given by v(X). There exist four outsourcing regimes, denoted by δ ≡ δIδD ∈
{II, IU, UU, UI}. If δ = II, then X = 0; if δ = IU , then X = qD; if δ = UU , then
X = qI + qD = Q. Finally, if δ = IU (i.e., D outsources to I but I outsources to U),
then I outsources qI to U to meet its own demand; in addition, it also orders qD from U to
fulfill the demand of D. Therefore, total quantity ordered from U is X = qI + qD = Q. Let
q = (qI , qD). Payoffs for each firm at the terminal nodes are pi
δ
k, k = I,D, given by
(piIII (pI ; q), pi
II
D (pI ; q)) = (P (Q)qI − CI(Q) + pIqD, P (Q)qD − pIqD)
(piIUI (v; q), pi
IU
D (v; q)) = (P (Q)qI − CI(qI), P (Q)qD − v(qD)qD)
(piUUI (v; q), pi
UU
D (v; q)) = (P (Q)qI − v(Q)qI , P (Q)qD − v(Q)qD)
(piUII (pI , v; q), pi
UI
D (pI , v; q)) = (P (Q)qI − v(Q)Q+ pIqD, P (Q)qD − pIqD)
Our main result to game G asserts that if the cost disadvantage of U is not too significant
(i.e. λ is not too large), then both I and D outsourcing to U is the unique SPNE outsourcing
regime. The main result is also summarized in Figure 1 below, in which λ is varied on the
horizontal axis.
The Main Result There is a threshold θ ∈ (1, λ¯] such that if λ ∈ [1, θ), then in any SPNE,
both I and D orders α exclusively from U.
Figure 1: SPNE Outsourcing Regime
6The exclusivity can be justified on the ground that intermediate goods produced by different providers
might be specialized, making it infeasible for the final-good producer to use multiple sources of intermediate
goods in the same production process. Moreover, there can be negotiation cost in the transaction for the
intermediate good.
7This assumption is meant to simplify the analysis. Our essential finding will not be affected if U is an
upstream monopolist and thus can strategically determine its price for good α.
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Observe that when λ ∈ (1, θ), U has a cost disadvantage compared to I, yet both I and
D outsource α to U rather than to I. Strategic considerations dominate firms’ behavior here.
This confirms our claim that outsourcing to offshore locations can persist due to strategic
effect of scale economies, even if offshore costs rise moderately as long as offshore producers
abstain from the final good markets.
3 Model Analysis
In this section, we shall first characterize the SPNE of game G. Its proof is derived after we
illustrate the procedure of backward induction to solve the game.
3.1 SPNE of Game G: The Detailed Characterization
Before we fully characterize SPNE of game G, it is useful to define θ:
θ ≡ min(λ¯, λ˜),
where λ˜ is defined below. It is also useful to define λˆ:
λ˜ ≡ A−B
√
49− 52c
2b(52c2 − 105c+ 54) , λˆ ≡
a(3− 4c) + Z√1− c
b(3− 4c+ 3√1− c) ,
with A = a(80c2 − 144c + 63) + b(24c2 − 66c + 45), B = (3 − 2c)(3 − 4c)(a − b), Z =
2b(3− 2c)− a(3− 4c). We have 1 < λ˜ < λˆ. If c is not very close to 1/2, then λˆ < λ¯.
Price of U can take two values in SPNE, v¯ and v, defined as
v¯ ≡ bλ(3− 4c)− c(a+ b− 2ac)
3− 6c+ 2c2 , v ≡
3bλ− 2ac
3− 2c .
Also define function p¯I(v) as
p¯I(v) ≡ 3− 2c
3− 4cv −
(a+ b− 2ac)c
(3− 4c)(1− c) .
Define I’s monopoly price as pM ≡ a+b−2ac
2(1−c) < a. We have p
M > v¯ > v > 0, and p¯I(v) < v
for v < pM .
Theorem 1 SPNE of game G is characterized below.
(I) For λ ∈ [1, θ), δ = UU is the unique SPNE outsourcing regime. In any SPNE,
v = v, pI ≥ v.
(II) For λ ∈ (θ, λ¯), δ = II is the unique SPNE outsourcing regime. Moreover, (v, pI) =
(v¯, p¯I(v¯)) if λ > λˆ, (v, pI) = (v, p¯I(v)) if λ < λˆ, and (v, pI) is either (v¯, p¯I(v¯)) or
(v, p¯I(v)) at λ = λˆ.
(III) If λ˜ < λ¯ (i.e. θ = λ˜), two outsourcing regimes can arise in SPNE at λ = θ: either
δ = UU with v = v, pI ≥ v; or δ = II with (v, pI) = (v, p¯I(v)).
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Proof: Proof is in the following subsection.
When the offshore fringe has cost disadvantage, the existence of SPNE where δ = UU
hinges on the existence of economies of scale. As shown by the following corollary, when the
size of scale economies shrinks, so does the range of λ where both I and D outsource to U .
The intuition is as follows. Since U is less efficient, the smaller the economies of scale, the
more inclined D is to outsource to I: first, D becomes less concerned about the competitive
edge I can acquire through supplying D; second, there can be a larger efficiency gain. As a
result, in SPNE the range of λ is larger where D orders from I and I produces in-house.
Corollary 1 θ → 1 when c→ 0.
Proof: It follows by noticing that limc→0 λ¯ = a+b2b > 1 and limc→0 λ˜ = 1.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In order to derive proof of Theorem 1, we first do backward induction to solve game G. We
start from the quantity decisions in stage three for given outsourcing regimes.
The values of (pI , v) relevant are such that in equilibrium both I and D produce positive
quantities for β, given by pI < p
M , v < pM . There exists a unique Cournot equilibrium
(qδI(pI , v), q
δ
D(pI , v)) in each outsourcing regime δ (details are given in Appendix). The cor-
responding equilibrium payoffs are
(piIII (pI), pi
II
D (pI)) = ([q
II
I (pI) + q
II
D (pI)]
2H − [qIID (pI)]2, [qIID (pI)]2);
(piIUI (v), pi
IU
D (v)) = ([q
IU
I (v)]
2(1− c), [qIUD (v)]2);
(piUUI (v), pi
UU
D (v)) = ([q
UU
I (v)]
2, [qUUD (v)]
2);
(piUII (pI , v), pi
UI
D (pI , v)) = ([q
UI
I (pI , v)]
2 + (pI − v)qUID (pI , v), [qUID (pI , v)]2).
(4)
Here H ≡ a+bc−2b+(1−c)pI
2a−b−pI . The following lemma follows direct calculation and is intuitive:
when I produces in-house and D outsources to I, I prefers to charge pI for D as high as
possible for profit from the upstream market as well as raising rival’s cost.
Lemma 1
dpiIII (pI)
dpI
> 0 for pI ∈ (0, pM).
We move back to stage two. At given value v, when I produces in-house, there exists a
threshold value of pI given by p¯I(v). If and only if pI < p¯I(v), D strictly prefers ordering
from I to ordering from U . Notice that p¯I(v) < v, implying that if I produces in-house, D
will order from I if and only if pI is sufficiently lower than v. The following lemma follows
direct calculation.
Lemma 2 piIID (pI) T piIUD (v) for pI S p¯I(v).
We move back to stage one, where I and U compete in prices for supplying α. Let us first
rule out a trivial equilibrium. When pI = v, given that I outsources to U , D is indifferent
between ordering from I or from U , and it can occur that D orders from I. It thus can
arise in equilibrium that pI = v, followed by δ = UI. However, this equilibrium in essence
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is δ = UU . To avoid this trivial equilibrium, we treat any SPNE with pI = v followed by
δ = UI as δ = UU .8
We have several major findings to the price competition in stage one. First, it can be
shown that, whenever pI 6= v, δ = UI can not be in any SPNE. Hence in equilibrium, U
supplies positive quantity only in outsourcing regime UU or IU . If outsourcing regime is
IU , U ’s price v is solved from v = AC(qIUD (v)) as v¯; if outsourcing regime is UU , v is solved
from v = AC(qUUI (v)+ q
UU
D (v)) as v. Second, given that pI = p¯I(v), at either v = v¯ or v = v,
I is better off also supplying D whenever I produces in-house to meet its own demand of α.
In other words, I always prefers regime II to IU . Third, given that v = v and D outsources
to U , I strictly prefers regime UU to IU only if the cost disadvantage of U is not too big,
i.e., λ < λˆ. Finally, comparing regimes II and UU for I under (pI , v) = (p¯I(v), v), we find
that I strictly prefers regime UU to II only if λ < λ˜. The following lemma summarizes the
major findings to stage one.
Lemma 3 (a) In any SPNE, it can not be pI 6= v and δ = UI.
(b) piIII (p¯I(v¯)) > pi
IU
I (v¯); pi
II
I (p¯I(v)) ≥ piIUI (v) with equality holds only at λ = 1.
(c) If λˆ < λ¯, then piUUI (v) T piIUI (v) for λ S λˆ. Otherwise piUUI (v) > piIUI (v).
(d) If λˆ < λ¯, then v = v for λ < λˆ, v = v¯ for λ > λˆ, either v = v or v = v¯ at λ = λˆ.
Otherwise v = v.
(e) If λ˜ < λ¯, then piUUI (v) T piIII (p¯I(v)) for λ S λ˜. Otherwise piUUI (v) > piIII (p¯I(v)).
Proof: (a) Suppose not. Given δI = U , if D deviates from δD = I to δD = U , its profit
changes from piUID (pI , v) to pi
UU
D (v). For D to have no incentive to deviate, it must be pI < v
by (4). However, again by (4), I will deviate to pI = v followed by δI = U , since its profit is
larger in this case no matter δD = I or δD = U . A contradiction.
(b), (c), (e) follows direct calculation. (d) follows (c) and the perfect competition in
upstream fringe.
We are now ready to give proof of Theorem 1. Since proof of parts (I), (II) and (III) are
similar, we only gives proof of (I) in Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 (I) Step one. We show that given v = v, pI ≥ v, δ = UU is in SPNE.
Given δI = U , if D deviates from δD = U to δD = I, its profit changes from pi
UU
D (v) to
piUID (pI). By (4), D is no better off for pI = v and is worse off for pI > v. Thus D will not
deviate. On the other side, given δD = U , if I deviates from δI = U to δI = I, its profit
changes from piUUI (v) to pi
IU
D (pI). By Lemma 3(c), it is worse off since λ < min(λ¯, λ˜) < λˆ. I
will not deviate either. Thus δ = UU is in SPNE.
Step two. We show that v = v, pI ≥ v is in SPNE. By Lemma 3(d), v = v. We need
to check if I has incentive to deviate to pI < v. Suppose it deviates. Then in stage two,
δ = UU can not arise since by (4), D will deviate from δD = U to δD = I. Moreover, δ = IU
can not arise since by Lemma 3(c), I is profitable deviating from δI = I to δI = U . Suppose
δ = UI in stage two. By (4), I is strictly worse off under UI than under UU . Hence I will
not deviate to pI < v for δ = UI. Suppose δ = II in stage two. By Lemma 2, it can be
8Assuming the existence of some transaction cost for I to supply D can break the tie and make any SPNE
with pI = v followed by δ = UI disappear.
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the case only if pI ≤ p¯I(v), otherwise D will deviate from δD = I to δD = U . However, by
Lemma 3(e) and Lemma 1, I is strictly worse off. Thus I will not deviate to pI < v for
δ = II either. We conclude that under no circumstance will I deviates to pI < v.
Step three. We show that there does not exist other SPNE. First, v = v by Lemma 3(d).
Second, by Lemma 3(a), δ = UI is off-equilibrium. Third, for λ < λˆ, by Lemma 3(c),
δ = IU is off-equilibrium. Fourth, suppose in some SPNE δ = II. By Lemma 2, it must
be pI ≤ p¯I(v) < v. However, I is profitable deviating to p′I > v. By doing so, by step one,
Lemma 2, Lemma 3(a) and (c), it must be δ = UU in stage two. Then by Lemma 3(e), I
is strictly better off. A contradiction. II can not be in SPNE. Last, suppose in some SPNE
δ = UU with pI < v. However, by (4), D will deviate to δD = I, again a contradiction. We
conclude that there does not exist SPNE other than v = v, pI ≥ v, followed by δ = UU .
4 Discussion and Conclusion
We show that the strategic effect of scale economies can drive both integrated and disinte-
grated downstream firms to outsource offshore for intermediate goods, even if there is modest
cost disadvantage with offshore providers in producing the intermediate goods. The reason
is, under economies of scale in upstream production, disintegrated downstream firm tends to
purchase intermediate goods from offshore pure provider rather than its vertically integrated
rival. Then driven by the incentive to exploit scale economies, vertically integrated firm will
give up in-house production and also outsource offshore.
In our setting, the existence of offshore competitive fringe sustains a duopoly market
for the final good β and consumers are almost always better off. Without the fringe, the
integrated firm I will charge a high price for good α to drive firm D out of the market, then
produce in-house good α as a monopolist. If so, its monopoly quantity of good β is given by
a− pM = (a− b)/2(1− c). As long as λ < λ¯, the emergence of offshore fringe ensures that
both I and D are active in the market β. If the cost disadvantage of U is relatively big (i.e.
λ ∈ (θ, λ¯)) so that in equilibrium δ = II (both I and D orders good α from I), it is verifiable
that the duopoly quantity is always larger than the monopoly quantity, hence consumers are
better off. In this case, production is also efficient since the low-cost firm I supplies good
α. If the cost disadvantage of U is modest (i.e. λ ∈ [1, θ)) such that in equilibrium δ = UU
(both I and D orders good α from U), the duopoly quantity is almost always larger than
the monopoly quantity. We find that, exception occurs only in extreme cases where c is very
close to 1/2 and λ is very close to the corresponding θ.9
Although we exogenously assume the exclusivity in downstream firms’ sourcing mode
throughout our analysis, exclusivity can arise endogenously due to scale economies in up-
stream production technology. Moreover, our model can be extended to including two or
9For example, suppose a = 10, b = 9.5. By (3), the upper bound of c is 0.475. For c < 0.4473,
the duopoly quantity under δ = UU is always larger than the monopoly quantity. Let c = 0.47, then
θ = min{λ¯, λ˜} = 1.0025. Then for λ < 1.0015, the duopoly quantity under δ = UU is larger than the
monopoly quantity. The reverse is true for λ > 1.0015. The intuition is as follows. When δ = UU with c
very close to 12 and λ very close to its upper bound θ, two effects result in a smaller duopoly quantity than
the monopoly quantity. On the one side, since U has a relatively large cost disadvantage, it charges a high
price of good α for the downstream duopolists, leading to a relatively small duopoly quantity. On the other
side, since I faces large scale economies when it produces in-house as a monopolist, it produces a relatively
large monopoly quantity in order to better exploit economies of scale.
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more downstream disintegrated firms, which will strengthen the strategic effect of scale
economies in driving downstream competitors to outsource offshore. In the type-symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium, all these disintegrated firms order from the offshore pure supplier,
which further drives down the supplier’s average cost hence also its price of α, making the
integrated firm to be more willingly outsource offshore.
Our results are derived under downstream quantity competition with homogeneous prod-
ucts. One concern is to what extent our results carry over price competition. Suppose firms
I and D produce heterogeneous good β and decide their prices in stage three. Literature
shows that, in context of price competition and linear production cost, strategic consider-
ation can lead firm D to favor firm I for the supply of good α. The reason is, when I is
making profit in the market α by supplying D, I has less incentive to lower its price for
good β because aggressive pricing will reduce D’s sale hence hurt I’s profit in the market α.
(see Chen (2001); Chen et al. (2004); Arya et al. (2008b)). Here with economies of scale in
the production of α, D’s outsourcing to I imposes two opposite effects on the competition
in the market β. On the one side, it gives I a competitive edge on account of economies
of scale, making I more aggressive. On the other side, it creates the strategic incentive
for I to soften downstream price competition, as identified in Chen (2001), making I less
aggressive. Nevertheless, we find that, as long as the cost disadvantage of the offshore fringe
is not too big, the first effect can dominate. With price competition, it again occurs that,
in equilibrium both I and D outsource to the offshore fringe for good α even if the offshore
provider has a modest cost disadvantage.
Appendix
When both firms I and D are active in the market β, their Cournot quantities in stage
three for each outsourcing regime are given below. After that, two observations are listed
out, which shows that in SPNE, upstream prices (pI , v) indeed lead to positive quantities
produced by I and D. Note that pM > 2b−a−2ac
1−2c and p
M > 2b− a.
a. δ = II. If pI ∈ (2b−a−2ac1−2c , pM), Cournot quantity for each firm is positive, given by
qIII (pI) =
a+ 2ac− 2b+ (1− 2c)pI
3− 2c , q
II
D (pI) =
a+ b− 2ac− 2(1− c)pI
3− 2c .
b. δ = IU . If v ∈ (2b− a, pM), Cournot quantity for each firm is positive, given by
qIUI (v) =
a− 2b+ v
3− 4c , q
IU
D (v) =
a+ b− 2ac− 2(1− c)v
3− 4c .
c. δ = UU . For v < a, Cournot quantity is positive for each firm, given by
qUUI (v) = q
UU
D (v) =
a− v
3
.
d. δ = UI. For a+ pI > 2v, a+ v > 2pI , Cournot quantity of each firm is positive, given
by
qUII (v, pD) =
a+ pI − 2v
3
, qUID (v, pD) =
a+ v − 2pI
3
.
Observation 1 v¯ > 2b− a; pM > v¯ > v > 0.
Observation 2 p¯I(v¯), p¯I(v) ∈ (2b−a−2ac1−2c , pM).
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